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Non-Technical Summary
The literature on fiscal competition among local governments has so far mainly focussed on
the aspect of tax competition. The standard argument states that competing governments
lower their tax rates in order to attract a mobile tax base, thereby neglecting negative
externalities which arise for other jurisdictions. The bottom line is an inefficiently low level
of taxation and a relative underprovision of public goods. Recent theoretical literature
suggests that fiscal externalities resulting from tax competition tend to be internalised by
redistributive grant systems, thereby raising efficiency of local public finances. Empirical
research supports the view that revenue sharing exerts a strong impact on jurisdictions’ tax
policy.
An aspect which has attracted lesser attention in the literature on fiscal competition is that
local governments may also compete for mobile tax bases via the provision of productivity-
enhancing public goods. Theoretical research suggests that fiscal competition in the presence
of a public input to production leads to a bias in the local spending mix, i.e. a relative
overprovision of this public input compared to purely consumptive public goods.
In this paper we use a simple model of bi-dimensional fiscal competition in taxes and public
inputs. We then introduce a redistributive grant scheme to analyze the incentive effects of
fiscal equalization transfers on local tax and spending decisions. As already shown in the
literature we find that fiscal capacity equalization induces local jurisdictions to increase dis-
tortionary taxation of a mobile tax base. In addition, increasing the degree of redistribution
- while compensating for budgetary effects - induces local governments to rebalance their
budget towards a lower budgetary share of the publicly provided input. Therefore, in our
analysis the implementation of a system of fiscal equalization alleviates both, tax as well as
expenditure competition. Moreover, in the case of full equalization of tax bases, composi-
tional inefficiencies in local spending vanish when assuming inelastic supply of capital.
While recent studies have already analyzed the incentive effects of fiscal equalization grants
on local tax policy in Germany, the empirical analysis presented in this paper - to the best
of our knowledge - is the first focusing on local public spending. The estimations are based
on a panel of German municipalities in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. As municipalities
within their self-administration responsibilities decide on infrastructure spending on the
local street network as well as spending on local schools, Germany is an interesting case
to study in our context. Moreover, municipal tax bases are equalized to a large extent via
the municipal system of fiscal equalization. We make use of non-linearities in this grant
scheme and implement a regression discontinuity estimator to identify the incentive effect of
fiscal equalization transfers. The results suggest that in line with the theoretical predictions
jurisdictions that are facing higher marginal contribution rates to the municipal system of
fiscal equalization are not only characterized by a higher local business tax rate but also
by a lower budgetary shares of public investment in the fields of street infrastructure and
education.
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1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the incentive effect of fiscal equalization transfers on local expenditure
policies and thereby extends the literature on the internalizing impact of redistributive grant
systems which has so far focused on local tax policy. Among others, Koethenbuerger (2002)
and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) bring forward the argument, that in the presence of tax
competition for a mobile capital tax base, transfer schemes which inversely relate to the
tax base tend to reduce marginal cost of raising public funds and induce local governments
to increase their taxing effort. Inefficiencies in local public finances as suggested by the
traditional tax competition literature (e.g., Wilson, 1986; Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986;
Wildasin, 1988;) are thereby - at least partially - corrected for. Previous empirical research
by Buettner (2006) and Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart (2007) supports the view that
revenue sharing exerts a significant impact on jurisdictions’ tax policy.
An aspect which has attracted lesser attention in the theoretical literature on fiscal com-
petition is that local governments may also compete for the mobile tax base via the pro-
vision of a public input to production and that expenditure competition might give rise
to an additional source of inefficiency. Extending the seminal contribution by Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986), Keen and Marchand (1997) present a standard framework of fiscal com-
petition where local jurisdictions have available two policy instruments. They show that
in the presence of a productivity-enhancing public good, the composition of local public
spending tends to be systematically biased towards a relative overprovision of public inputs
compared to public goods which are consumed directly by residents. Hindriks, Peralta, and
Weber (2006) present a model of tax and public input competition and, in the presence of
a tax revenue sharing scheme, focus on the interaction of the two policy instruments when
regions are heterogenous. In their dynamic setting the authors find that local jurisdictions
have an incentive to underinvest in stage one of the game in order to alleviate second-stage
tax competition. The implementation of a revenue sharing scheme in turn discourages local
public investment while exerting only a small impact on local tax policy.
In this paper we follow Keen and Marchand (1997) and use a static model of bi-dimensional
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fiscal competition. We then introduce a redistributive grant scheme to analyze the incentive
effects of fiscal equalization transfers on local tax and spending decisions. As already shown,
e.g., in Bucovetsky and Smart (2006), we find that fiscal capacity equalization induces local
jurisdictions to increase distortionary taxation of the mobile tax base. In addition, increas-
ing the degree of redistribution - while compensating for budgetary effects - induces local
governments to rebalance their budget towards a lower budgetary share of the publicly pro-
vided input. Therefore, in our analysis the implementation of a system of fiscal equalization
alleviates both, tax as well as expenditure competition. Moreover, in the case of full equal-
ization of tax bases, the compositional inefficiencies in local spending pointed out by Keen
and Marchand (1997) vanish when assuming inelastic supply of capital.
While two recent studies (Buettner, 2006; Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart, 2007) have
analyzed the incentive effects of fiscal equalization grants on local tax policy in Germany, the
empirical analysis presented in this paper - to the best of our knowledge - is the first focusing
on local public spending. The estimations are based on a panel of German municipalities in
the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. As municipalities within their self-administration respon-
sibilities, decide on infrastructure spending on the local street network as well as spending
on local schools Germany is an interesting case to study in our context. Following Buettner
(2006) we make use of non-linearities in the grant scheme and implement a regression dis-
continuity estimator to identify the incentive effect of fiscal equalization transfers. We find
that, in line with the theoretical predictions, jurisdictions that are facing higher marginal
contribution rates to the municipal system of fiscal equalization are characterized by lower
budgetary shares of public investment in the fields of street infrastructure and education.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we conduct the theoretical analysis and derive
testable empirical implications. Section 3 then describes the empirical analysis of local
expenditure policies in Germany. Conclusions are drawn in section 4.
2
2 Theoretical Analysis
The model in this paper builds on the theoretical analysis in Hauptmeier (2007). We use
a standard framework of fiscal competition (e.g., Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986; Keen
and Marchand, 1997) and consider a federation with a set of n local jurisdictions, labelled
i = 1, ..., n. In each jurisdiction a competitive firm produces a homogenous private good
using immobile labor L, perfectly mobile capital K and a publicly provided input P . The
common production technology F (L,K, P ) is assumed to be linear homogenous with respect
to labor and capital. The public input P is of the factor-augmenting type and raises marginal
productivity of the primary input factors, capital and labor. For analytical convenience labor
is normalized to unity and we assume that firms in jurisdiction i produce according to the
following (per labor unit) production technology:
f(ki, Pi) = k
α
i P
β
i = k
α
i (λibi)
β, α+ β ≤ 1
As in Hauptmeier (2007) the impact of public inputs is modelled by introducing a shift-
term, P βi , into the production function which captures total factor productivity. The public
input is substituted by its budgetary share λi times the local budget, bi. By assumption,
the production function exhibits non-increasing returns to scale, i.e. α+ β ≤ 1.
Each jurisdiction levies a source based tax (τi) on locally installed capital. Profit max-
imization and free capital mobility imply an equal net rate of return to capital r across
jurisdictions which is given by the after tax marginal product of capital
r = fki − τi.
The profit maximisation condition implies per-capita demand for capital ki = φ(r + τi, λi)
and implicit differentiation yields
∂ki
∂r
=
∂ki
∂τi
=
1
fkiki
< 0,
∂ki
∂λi
= −fkiλi
fkiki
> 0.
Therefore, a higher net rate of return as well as a higher tax rate reduces capital demand
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in jurisdiction i while a higher budgetary share of the public input raises it.
The representative consumer in jurisdiction i derives utility from private (ci) and public
(Zi) consumption according to a well behaved and quasi linear utility function
ui = ci + v(Zi) = ci + v ((1− λi)bi) .
Note that v constitutes an increasing and strictly concave function and public consumption
is substituted by its budgetary share times the local budget. Per-capita private consumption
ci is given by
ci = k
α
i (λibi)
β − ki(r + τi) + sir,
where si labels capital endowment per-capita in jurisdiction i. The budget of the local
government i which is used to finance public consumption and the public input reads
bi = τiki + gi,
where gi constitutes grants from the federal government. As in Buettner (2006) the upper
level government administrates a system of local fiscal equalization by setting a marginal
contribution rate (ϑi) such that income from grants (gi) can be represented as a linear
function of the tax base
gi = yi − ϑiki. (1)
Unconditional transfers1 from the upper level government are labelled yi. In order to close
the model we assume that the capital market equilibrium is given by
∑
j
kj =
∑
j
sj,
so that total capital demand in the federation is satisfied by total capital endowment.
1These are the transfers a jurisdiction would receive if its tax base were actually zero.
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Implicitly differentiating the capital market condition yields
∂r
∂τi
= −
∂ki
∂τi∑
j
∂ki
∂r
< 0,
∂r
∂λi
= −
∂ki
∂λi∑
j
∂ki
∂r
> 0.
Similar to Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), we assume that the number of jurisdictions n
in the national economy is large and therefore the (net) interest rate effect of variations in
either policy instrument is not taken into account by local governments.
Local jurisdictions simultaneously choose their policy instruments τi and λi given the optimal
choices of the other jurisdictions while neglecting the external impacts of their policies. The
unconstrained maximization problem of jurisdiction i reads
max
τi,λi
ui(τi, λi) = k
α
i (λibi)
β − ki (r + τi) + si r + v ((1− λi) bi) (2)
The first order conditions from the perspective of jurisdiction i are
∂ui
∂τi
= −ki +
(
kαi β(λibi)
β−1 − v′)(λi∂bi
∂τi
)
+ v′
∂bi
∂τi
!
= 0, (3)
∂ui
∂λi
=
(
kαi β(λibi)
β−1 − v′)(bi + λi ∂bi
∂λi
)
+ v′
∂bi
∂λi
!
= 0. (4)
From (4) one can immediately see that in the local government optimum the marginal prod-
uct of the publicly provided input to production (kαi β(λibi)
β−1) falls below the marginal
utility of public consumption (v′). Compared to a first best situation under policy coordi-
nation2 where governments provide public goods efficiently, i.e. kα−γi β(λibi)
β−1 = v′ = 1, we
observe a distortion of the local spending decision due to the productivity effect of public
input provision. This finding is in line with Keen and Marchand (1997) who analyse the
impact of fiscal competition on the pattern of public spending and come to the conclusion
that public inputs are relatively overprovided in an uncoordinated equilibrium.
2Note that one has to assume that national policy coordination does not affect capital supply to the
federation.
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Solving both first order conditions (3) and (4) for
(
kαi β(λibi)
β−1 − v′) and equating them
leaves us with
v′ =
ki
∂bi
∂τi
+ λi
ki
bi
∂bi
∂λi
∂bi
∂τi
(5)
=
ki
ki + (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂τi
(1 + εbi,λi) ,
where εbi,λi =
∂bi
∂λi
λi
bi
labels the elasticity of the local budget with respect to the share of
the public input. One observes the usual optimality condition that the marginal rate of
substitution (MRS) between public and private consumption (v′) equals the marginal rate
of transformation (MRT). The MRT consists of two terms, where ki
ki+(τi−ϑi) ∂ki∂τi
captures the
marginal cost raising public funds (MCPF) and the multiplicative factor (1 + εbi,λi) arises
due to the self-financing effect of the public input. As the marginal contribution rate ϑi
enters the RHS of equation (5) the redistributive grant system allows the federal government
to adjust the local cost of raising public funds (see, among others, Buettner, Hauptmeier,
and Schwager, 2006). By implementing full equalization, i.e. τi = ϑi, the MCPF reduce
to one as in this case εbi,λi = 0 and the first term of the RHS of (5) obviously equals one.
This is in line with Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) who - in a pure tax competition setting -
show that if saving is inelastic full equalization establishes efficiency of local public finances.
Using τi = ϑi in either of the first order conditions (3) and (4) leads to the fact that the gap
between the marginal product of the public input (kαi β(λibi)
β−1) and the marginal utility
of public consumption (v′) vanishes. Therefore, full equalization corrects both, externalities
arising from tax as well as expenditure competition in the presence of a publicly provided
input to production.
When fiscal equalization is only partial, i.e. τi > ϑi, underprovision of the public consump-
tion good occurs as MCPF exceed one. This is apparent from equation (5) as the first term
on the RHS is greater than one due to the marginal tax base effect of an increase in the
tax rate (∂ki
∂τi
< 0) and the fact that the elasticity of the local budget with respect to the
share of the public input (εbi,λi) is positive. Comparing MCPF in a pure tax competition
setting (see, e.g., Buettner, 2006) with the RHS of equation (5) shows that when local ju-
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risdiction have available two instruments, i.e. τi and λi, to compete for the mobile capital
tax base fiscal competition becomes fiercer. This results from the self-financing effect of the
public input which is captured by the factor (1+ εbi,λi) > 1. Therefore, compared to a pure
tax competition setting, the presence of the productivity enhancing public input leads to a
further increase of the MRS between public and private consumption.
Comparative static analysis of adjustments in the marginal contribution rate ϑi generates
further insights on how the federal government can affect the local MCPF by inducing
jurisdictions to adjust their policy parameters τi and λi. Therefore, we rearrange optimality
condition (5) to derive an implicit function,
Γ (τi, λi, ϑi, yi) =
ki
ki + (τi − ϑi) ∂ki∂τi
(1 + εbi,λi)− v′ = 0, (6)
and apply the implicit function theorem to derive the comparative static effects of a changes
in the marginal contribution rate ϑi on the two policy parameters
dτi
dϑi
= −
∂Γ
∂ϑi
∂Γ
∂τi
, (7)
dλi
dϑi
= −
∂Γ
∂ϑi
∂Γ
∂λi
. (8)
From the second order conditions of the unconstrained maximization problem (2) we know
that ∂Γ
∂τi
> 0 and ∂Γ
∂λi
< 0. Therefore, the signs of the derivative of the implicit function Γ
with respect to the marginal contribution rate will determine the signs of the comparative
static effects. Differentiating with respect to ϑi yields
∂Γ
∂ϑi
=
ki
∂bi
∂τi
(
∂ki
∂τi
∂bi
∂τi
(1 + εbi,λi)−
εbi,λi
(τi − ϑi)
)
− ∂bi
∂ϑi
(
(1− λi) v′′ + λiki
b2i
∂bi
∂λi
∂bi
∂τi
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂Γ
∂yi
, (9)
where ∂bi
∂τi
> 0 and ∂bi
∂λi
> 0, as increases in the tax rate as well as the share of the public
input improve the local budget. In contrast, the increase in the marginal contribution rate
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ϑi to the system of fiscal equalization has a negative budgetary effect, i.e.
∂bi
∂ϑi
< 0. The
overall impact of a marginal increase in ϑi can be separated into a ”substitiution” and an
”income” effect. The first term on the RHS of (9) captures the pure ”substitution effect”
which is negative and arises as MCPF are reduced by raising the degree of redistribution
within the federation. Negative tax base effects of increases in the local capital tax rate τi
as well as beneficial tax base effects due to an improvement of the budgetary share of public
inputs λi are now ”shared” to a greater extent by all jurisdictions within the system of fiscal
equalization. The second term on the RHS of (9) captures the ”income effect” induced by
the increase in the marginal contribution rate. As indicated, the term in brackets depicts
the marginal impact of unconditional federal transfers yi, which is multiplied by
∂bi
∂ϑi
< 0
and cannot be signed unambiguously. Ceteris paribus, a decrease in public funds directly
reduces public consumption as well as public input provision according to the respective
budgetary shares. This in turn leads to an increased marginal utility of Zi but also to a
higher marginal productivity of Pi. The adjustment of the endogenous budgetary structure
then depends on the specification of the utility function, which is general in our case, and
the assumptions concerning production technology.
As we are primarily interested in the incentive effects of fiscal equalization, we will focus on
budget-compensated effects of variations in the marginal contribution rate. Therefore, we
analyze the comparative static effects of an increase in ϑi while compensating for budgetary
losses by a corresponding increase in unconditional transfers, i.e. dbi = −ki dϑi + dyi != 0.
This yields the following budget-compensated comparative static effects of an increase in
ϑi:
∂τi
∂ϑi
∣∣∣∣
comp.
> 0,
∂λi
∂ϑi
∣∣∣∣
comp.
< 0 (10)
We observe that a budget-compensated increase in the marginal contribution rate induces
the local jurisdiction to increase its tax rate on mobile capital. This finding is in line with
the theoretical literature stating that fiscal capacity based equalization tends to decrease
the marginal cost of raising public funds, thereby generating incentives for participating
governments to raise distortionary taxation. This helps to enhance efficiency in the presence
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of tax competition for a mobile tax base (Koethenbuerger, 2002; Bucovetsky and Smart,
2006). While this tax rate effect is well known from the literature we also show that by
increasing the marginal contribution rate, the upper-level government is able to affect the
composition of local spending as a higher degree of redistribution induces the jurisdiction to
lower its budgetary share of the public input. Thereby, compositional inefficiencies in local
spending as suggested by Keen and Marchand (1997) are at least reduced.
3 Empirical Analysis
The following empirical analysis aims at testing the theoretical predicted incentive effect of
fiscal equalization on local public spending. We exploit a rich data set of municipalities in the
major German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. In our context, Germany is a very interesting
case to study as the municipal system of fiscal equalization, which is administrated by the
states, is characterized by substantial redistribution of fiscal resources. Moreover, within
their self-administration responsibilities, municipalities decide on spending on local streets
and schools, two expenditure categories which can be classified as ”productive” spending.
In the following we will give a description of the German system of municipal fiscal equal-
ization. Section (3.2) then describes the data set and discusses the estimation approach. In
Section (3.3) the results are presented.
3.1 Municipal Fiscal Equalisation in Germany
The German system of municipal fiscal equalization in principal has two objectives, namely
firstly, to provide municipalities with additional revenues in order to fulfill their self-ad-
ministrated spending responsibilities (”vertical equalization”) and secondly, to equalize ex-
cessive fiscal capacity differences (”horizontal equalization”). While each state in Germany
administrates its own municipal equalization system and therefore institutional differences
occur, the basic structure is similar across states. Here, we focus on the system in the state
of Baden-Wuerttemberg.
9
In principle, fiscal capacity equalization is achieved by reducing the difference between what
is defined by law as fiscal need3 and a municipality‘s fiscal capacity4. According to their
relative fiscal capacity, i.e. the ratio of fiscal need to fiscal capacity, local jurisdictions
are categorized as having ”low”, ”medium” or ”high” fiscal capacity. The latter group
does not receive any transfers while municipalities with relative fiscal capacity smaller than
100% receive formula-based fiscal equalization grants. In addition, municipalities which are
characterized by a ”low” fiscal capacity receive transfers to ensure a relative fiscal capacity
of at least 60%. The fiscal equalization grants are partly financed by contributions all
municipalities have to finance out of their local tax revenues. Contributions to the state
and to the county occur in addition.
Buettner (2006) has shown that the municipal system of fiscal equalization can be sum-
marized by a linear function which relates grants to the tax base as depicted in (1). The
marginal contribution rate ϑi can thus be calculated as
ϑi ≡ τ rs + (τ0 − τ rs)
(
θlocali + θ
state
i + θ
equal
i
(
1− θlocali − θstatei
))
, (11)
where τ rs labels a uniform tax rate which determines revenue sharing with the federal and
state level and τ0 constitutes a standardising tax rate used to determine the taxing capacity
of the local business tax. In addition, municipalities have to finance contributions out of their
fiscal capacity to the county (θlocali ), the state (θ
state
i ) as well as formula-based contributions
into the system of fiscal equalization (θequali ). Note that transfers to the state and county
reduce fiscal equalization contributions.
Unconditional grants yi from the upper-level government are derived from
yi ≡ xi + ξini
(
1− θlocali − θstatei
)− (ϑi − τ rs
τ0 − τ rs
)
, (12)
3Fiscal need is determined by a basic per-capita allowance which is multiplied by the municipality‘s
population size.
4The fiscal capacity of a municipality is determined by the tax base of the local business tax as well as
other revenues, in particular the municipal share of income and corporate taxation.
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where xi labels other revenue and ni depicts fiscal need. The parameter ξi captures that
municipalities are being treated differently within the fiscal equalization system conditional
on whether they are characterized by a low, medium or high fiscal capacity.5
Table (1) gives an overview of the fiscal equalization parameters for the fiscal year 2004.
While fiscal need does not display substantial cross-sectional variation one observes a high
standard deviation in the case of fiscal capacity. Therefore, relative fiscal capacity varies
strongly between 32% and 414%. Around 90% of the municipalities in the state of Baden-
Wuerttemberg are characterized by low or medium fiscal capacity and receive fiscal equaliza-
tion transfers. One quarter of the sample displays a relative fiscal capacity below 60% and
therefore is eligible for additional equalization transfers. These municipalities are facing
particularly high marginal contribution rates. In the last two rows of table (1) descrip-
tive statistics for unconditional transfers (yi) and the marginal contribution rate (ϑi) are
presented. Both variables show substantial within variation.
Besides fiscal equalization grants, municipalities receive additional grants in order to fulfill
their self-administrated spending responsibilities. This also includes two types of specific
grants: Firstly, within the so called ”traffic and transport burden sharing” (”Verkehrslas-
tenausgleich”), municipalities receive general as well as lump-sum grants depending on the
length of the road network and the size of the municipal area respectively. Secondly, in the
course of ”school burden sharing” (”Schullastenausgleich”), municipalities receive transfers
depending on the number of pupils.
3.2 Data and Estimation Approach
Our empirical analysis is based on an annual database for the 1111 municipalities in the
German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. It covers the period between 1990 and 2003 as
some of the expenditure data is not available for the most recent fiscal year 2004. For
our estimations we reduce this sample in two ways. Firstly, we restrict our attention to
5For further details on the formalization of the municipal fiscal equalization system in the German state
of Baden-Wuertemberg see the Appendix in Buettner (2006).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for the fiscal equalization system in 2004
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Fiscal need (ni) e per capita 726 51.6 690 954.5
Fiscal capacity e per capita 548 205 187 3292
Relative fiscal capacity ratio .7536 .2712 .3260 4.14
Low fiscal capacity binary .2414 .4281 0 1
Medium fiscal capacity binary .6633 .4728 0 1
High fiscal capacity binary .0953 .2937 0 1
Rev. sharing tax rate (τ rs) in % .041 0 .041 .041
Standardizing tax rate (τ0) in % .145 0 .145 .145
County contribution rate (θlocal) in % .3280 .0428 .27 .421
State contribution rate (θstate) in % .2118 .0101 .2045 .2795
Fiscal equalization contribution rate (θequal) in % .7057 .2616 0 1
Unconditional grants (yi) e per capita 274 46.4 68.4 373.7
Marginal contribution rate (ϑi) in % .1313 .0118 .0922 .145
Sample size consists of 1102 municipalities in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg.
municipalities with a population of more than 10000. The reason for this is that revenues
from the municipal business tax, which states a tax on profits by local firms, are subject
to significant fluctuations. The instability of the tax base is apparent especially in small
municipalities, which are often characterized by a relatively homogenous economic structure.
Secondly, there exist 9 independent cities in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, which do
not belong to a county and therefore face different incentives within the municipal system
of fiscal equalization. We also exclude these observations. Table (2) gives an overview of
the underlying data for the reduced sample.
The local expenditure structure (λi) is calculated as the primary expenditure share of spend-
ing on basic schools and municipal roads. As in Hauptmeier (2007), we assume that these
two spending categories capture local ”investment spending”. The mean value of the ex-
penditure structure lies around 9.6 %, i.e. about 9.6 % of municipal spending (net of debt
service) relates to basic education and street infrastructure.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Expenditure structure (λi) in % 9.632 3.286 1.675 49.33
Fiscal equalization variables:
Marginal contribution rate (ϑi) in % 12.77 1.487 4.445 14.50
Unconditional transfers (yi) e per capita 296.9 50.00 123.5 373.7
Other grants (general) e per capita 4.818 9.258 0 101.3
Specific grants e per capita 18.61 31.00 0 252.0
Other control variables:
Population in 1000 24.68 16.80 10.24 112.0
Population density per km2 576.1 434.7 68.23 2494
Sample size: 2758 observations - 197 municipalities over 14 years (1990-2003).
The basic estimation equation is given in (13).
λi,t = λ (ϑi,t, yi,t ; xi,t, φi, ψt) (13)
We estimate the determinants of the local expenditure structure λi,t. The marginal contri-
bution rate to the municipal fiscal equalization system (ϑi,t) depicts the key variable on the
RHS of estimation equation (13). Its coefficient is assumed to capture the incentive effect
of fiscal equalization on local expenditure policies. In order to make sure that no ”income
effects” drive the results we control for unconditional transfers yi,t.
6 In addition, specific
grants as well as other general grants from the state and the federal level are are included
as control variables in xi,t. Finally, we also control for population size as well as population
density.
We use panel estimation techniques and impose regional fixed effects (φi) to avoid an omitted
variable bias due to unobserved local heterogeneity. We also control for common time shocks
by implementing time fixed effects (ψt).
6See Section 3.1 for details on the composition of unconditional and specific grants.
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As already pointed out by Buettner (2006) and Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart (2007)
a problem of endogeneity arises when trying to identify the incentive effects of fiscal equal-
ization because municipalities are able to influence their fiscal conditions - in particular the
fiscal capacity - which then determine the incentives faced within the redistributive grant
system. Similar to the case of local tax policy addressed in the above mentioned studies,
in our case one might expect that via their expenditure policy, municipalities - at least to
some extent - might affect their ”treatment” within the system of fiscal equalization due
to potential tax base effects of investment spending. Conceptually, this corresponds to a
problem of self-selection. Egger, Koethenbuerger, and Smart (2007) deal with this problem
by exploiting a natural experiment in terms of a reform of the fiscal equalization system.
Here we follow Buettner (2006) and use as an identification strategy the fact that incen-
tives within the municipal equalization system vary discontinuously with the relative fiscal
capacity. Figure (3.2) illustrates these discontinuities. Simulating marginal contribution
rates at average revenue sharing and county contribution rates for the year 2003 reveals dis-
continuous ”jumps” at the threshold levels of relative fiscal capacity defined by law.7 The
observed ”step function” is separated into three areas according to wether a jurisdiction is
characterized as having ”low”, ”medium” or ”high” fiscal capacity. Municipalities with a
fiscal capacity below 60% of fiscal need, on average, face the highest marginal contribution
rates leading to an average equalization rate (ϑi
τi
) amounting to 85%.8 The respective values
for the ”medium” and ”high” capacity regime are 77% and 61%.
Given the fact that small differences in relative fiscal capacity can lead to significant asym-
metries concerning the incentives faced by municipalities allows us to try to identify the
incentive effects of fiscal equalization by using a regression discontinuity estimator. The
”regression discontinuity approach” was first established by Campbell (1969). The idea
behind this approach is to identify the causal effect of a treatment that is assigned as a
deterministic function of an observed covariate, which is also related to the outcome of in-
7Note that unconditional transfers yi reveal a very similar pattern also characterized by discontinuous
”jumps” at the thresholds 0.6 and 1.
8Equalization rates are calculated by taking the ratio of the marginal contribution rate ϑi and the
statutory business tax rate τi.
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Figure 1: Discontinuities in municipal fiscal equalization
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terest. Recent applications of the regression discontinuity design include Angrist and Lavy
(1999), Van der Klaauw (2002) and Buettner (2006).
In our case the fiscal equalization parameters ϑi and yi depict deterministic functions of the
municipal relative fiscal capacity which are defined law. We therefore specify the following
estimation equation:
λi,t = β1ϑi,t + β2yi,t + β3ϕ(γi,t) + β4xi,t + φi + ψt + i,t (14)
Note that the impact of relative fiscal capacity (γi,t) on the local expenditure structure is
captured by a function ϕ(γi,t). By controlling for γi,t it is ensured that fiscal capacity differ-
ences do not drive the results and only discontinuities are exploited to identify the effects of
the fiscal equalization parameters. As the specification of ϕ(γi,t) is key to identification, we
employ several alternatives in order to capture possible non-linearities in the fiscal equal-
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ization system. Besides linear, quadratic as well as cubic specifications in the relative fiscal
capacity we therefore also employ a linear spline. This is done by interacting relative fiscal
capacity with regime dummies, i.e. ”low”, ”medium” and ”high” capacity.
Another important aspect one should consider when analyzing the determinants of the local
expenditure structure is that previous decisions might affect contemporary spending policies,
i.e. the expenditure structure might follow a partial adjustment process. The inclusion of
the lagged dependent variable on the RHS would be a means of capturing this intertemporal
policy aspect. However, in the context of a ”regression discontinuity approach” estimating a
partial adjustment model is not straightforward as conditioning on ϕ(γi,t) implies that only
the fiscal equalization parameters necessarily exhibit a behavioral interpretation. Therefore,
including lagged values of the covariates and estimating a reduced form equation conceptu-
ally constitutes a prudential way to take account for past policy decisions in our framework.
Heckman and Robb (1986) suggest this procedure as an alternative to an explicit dynamic
specification.
3.3 Results
Table (3) gives an overview of the basic regression results. Specifications (1) - (3) include
general and specific grants as well as linear and quadratic specifications in the population
size and density as conditioning variables. Besides controlling for regional and time fixed
effects we impose alternative specifications concerning the relative fiscal capacity.9
In all specifications we estimate a significant and negative effect of the marginal contribution
rate on the local expenditure structure. This is in line with the theoretical predictions from
the model described in Section (2), i.e. a higher marginal contribution rate should be
associated with a lower budgetary share of ”productive” spending on basic schools and the
local street network.
9Note that the linear specification is not reported as results resemble those of specification (1) while
featuring a lower R2.
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Table 3: Basic results (Dep. Var.: Expenditure structure)
Variable / Specification (1) (2) (3)
Marginal contribution rate -0.2132 ??? -0.1885 ??? -0.2883 ???
(0.0695) (0.0707) (0.0931)
Unconditional grants, per capita 0.0614 ??? 0.0599 ??? 0.0323
(0.0191) (0.0192) (0.0235)
Other grants (general), per capita 0.0955 0.0990 0.0908
(0.1591) (0.1612) (0.1577)
Specific grants, per capita 0.3526 ??? 0.3523 ??? 0.3526 ???
(0.0333) (0.0332) (0.0332)
Population, in 1000 0.0047 ??? 0.0047 ??? 0.0048 ???
(0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Population, squared -0.0000 ?? -0.0000 ?? -0.0000 ??
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Population density -0.0290 ??? -0.02910 ??? -0.02940 ???
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077)
Population density, squared 0.0009 ??? 0.0009 ??? 0.0009 ???
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Relative fiscal capacity squared cubic linear spline
Sample size 2758
Mean of dep. var. 0.0959
R-squared (adjusted) 0.5993 0.5998 0.5995
All specifications include regional and time fixed effects as well as controls for relative fiscal capacity
as denoted. If significant at 1% (5%) level coefficients are marked with three stars (two stars).
Note that while the fit of the model is more or less unaffected by using alternative specifica-
tions of the relative fiscal capacity, the magnitude of the coefficients of the marginal contri-
bution rate varies between specifications (1) - (3). In particular, conditioning on the linear
spline and thereby explicitly taking into account the three fiscal capacity regimes defined
by law leads to a stronger effect of the marginal contribution rate. Now, a one percent-
age point increase coincides with a 0.29 percentage point decrease of the local expenditure
structure compared to values of -0.21 and -0.19 in specification (1) and (2) respectively. In
addition, unconditional transfers which exert a significant and positive impact on the local
expenditure structure in the first two specifications turn insignificant when controlling for
the linear spline. It is also noteworthy that, when switching to the spline specification, the
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significance and the magnitude of the effects of the remaining conditioning variables are
basically unaffected. Quite intuitively, specific grants in the field of basic schools and road
infrastructure exert a significant and positive effect on the respective budgetary share. In
addition, this share increases along with population size and decreases with density.
As already discussed in Section (3.2) intertemporal policy aspects might play a role when
analyzing the determinants of the local budgetary structure. Therefore, Table (4) reports
results including lags of the covariates as further conditioning variables.
Taking into account dynamic effects marginally improves the R2 compared to the speci-
fications without lags in time whereas specification (2) reveals a slightly better fit. Most
noticeable, the contemporary marginal contribution rate turns insignificant when condition-
ing on a cubic polynomial in the relative fiscal capacity while we observe a lagged response of
the expenditure structure. The positive ”income effect” through unconditional transfers is
now only weakly significant and, again, relatively small compared to the ”incentive effect”.
Including lags in time in the linear spline specification leaves the contemporary effect of the
marginal contribution rate unaffected in terms of magnitude though the coefficient is less
precisely estimated. Again contemporary unconditional transfers do not exert a significant
impact on the local budgetary structure but we find a weakly significant and positive lagged
response.
Overall, the regression analysis confirms the presence of an incentive effects of fiscal equal-
ization grants as suggested by theory. The coefficient of the marginal contribution rate
has a negative sign in all reported estimations and the effect is statistical significant with
the exception of specification (1) in Table (4). Here we only observe a lagged response.
Notwithstanding, it must be highlighted that the magnitude of the incentive effect is sensi-
tive to the specification of relative fiscal capacity, the conditioning variable in the context
of the regression discontinuity approach. However, as capturing the nature of discontinuity
is key to identification when using discontinuity estimators, implementing the linear spline
specification and thereby explicitly taking account of the three fiscal capacity regimes de-
fined by law has a lot to commend it. While differences are small, the dynamic specification
combined with a linear spline in fiscal capacity also reveals the best fit.
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Table 4: Results with lags in time
Variable (1) (2)
Marginal contribution rate -0.1531 -0.2877 ??
(0.1063) (0.1472)
Unconditional grants, per capita 0.0502 ? 0.0016
(0.0294) (0.0374)
Other grants (general), per capita 0.0033 0.0068
(0.1280) (0.1293)
Specific grants, per capita 0.3376 ??? 0.3382 ???
(0.0342) (0.0341)
Population, in 1000 0.0300 ??? 0.0304 ???
(0.0090) (0.0084)
Population, squared -0.0000 ??? -0.0000 ???
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Density -0.1241 ??? -0.1258 ???
(0.0374) (0.0372)
Density, squared 0.0027 ??? 0.0028 ???
(0.0008) (0.0008)
Marginal contribution rate, lag -0.1990 ?? -0.1827
(.0910) (0.1234)
Unconditional grants, per capita, lag 0.0270 0.0609 ?
(0.0275) (0.0370)
Relative fiscal capacity cubic linear spline
Sample size 2561
Mean of dep. var. 0.0969
R-squared (adjusted) .60578 .60598
All specifications include regional and time fixed effects as well as controls for
relative fiscal capacity as denoted. Covariates are also employed as lagged values.
If significant at 1%, 5% or 10% level coefficients are marked with one star, two
and three stars.
Results for the ”income effect” of the grant system are mixed. While the theoretical analysis
in section (2) did not yield a clear-cut prediction on how a marginal increase in unconditional
transfers should affect the local expenditure composition, we observe a highly significant
and positive effect of these transfers in specifications (1) - (3) of the static estimations.
The significance of this effect completely disappears when conditioning on the linear spline.
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Switching to the dynamic specification reduces significance of the ”income effect” when
controlling for the cubic polynomial while we observe a positive and significant effect of
lagged unconditional transfers.
4 Conclusions
While the literature on the internalizing impact of redistributive grant systems has so far
mainly focused on the aspect of tax competition, we present a model of two-dimensional
fiscal competition in taxes and public inputs to analyze the incentive effects of fiscal equal-
ization transfers. Our findings are in line with previous theoretical analyses suggesting that
the implementation of capacity based equalization induces local governments to increase
distortionary taxation of a mobile capital tax base. In addition, this paper extends the
existing literature by pointing out that inefficiencies in local public spending as stated by
Keen and Marchand (1997) are reduced while the degree of redistribution within a system
of fiscal equalization rises.
This theoretically predicted incentive effect of fiscal equalization transfers on local expendi-
ture policies has then been tested on the basis of a rich data set of German municipalities.
Using a regression discontinuity approach which exploits non-linearities in the municipal
system of fiscal equalization, we find that a higher marginal contribution rate to the re-
distributive grant system induces local governments to reduce their budgetary share of
infrastructure spending on the local road network and basic school expenditures. The re-
sults are robust with respect to dynamic effects as well as various specifications capturing
discontinuities in municipal fiscal equalization.
While the theoretical analysis suggests that fiscal equalization tends to increase efficiency
of local public finances one must be careful when judging actual welfare effects. Buettner,
Hauptmeier, and Schwager (2006) further explore the conditions under which local grant
systems enforced by upper-level governments will enhance efficiency. In the context of the
German federation where fiscal policies of all levels of state are strongly interlinked by multi-
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level fiscal equalization and the sharing of common taxes, the study points to excessive local
taxation as a consequence of upper-level government attempts to extract fiscal resources. A
recent theoretical analysis by Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2006) puts forward the argument
that equalization programs can lead to perverse fiscal incentives if political accountability
is reduced. This might well be the case in countries characterized by a pronounced fiscal
federalism. Therefore, taking into account political incentives and possible inefficiencies of
the public sector when analyzing institutional issues in a fiscal competition context deserves
further attention.
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